1976: Its impact on Southeast Asia

THE HISTORY of Southeast Asia is rich in foible and even paradox, and remains up to this day and age, the subject of scholarly articles and debates. The 1950s and 1960s saw the newly-independent states struggled for nation building. Against this backdrop, efforts at regional cooperation, no matter their so-called failure, were attempted. MAPHILINDO and ASA, particularly the latter, were acknowledged as the forerunners of ASEAN.

Following the establishment of ASEAN, the original member states focused on strengthening internal security and economic development to realize the objectives they themselves laid out in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967.

In hindsight, the 5 founding states had their reasons to form the association. Indonesia a year earlier had concluded her Konfrontasi with Malaysia; Singapore, a new state, needed recognition by her neighbors; Thailand wanted to distance herself from the Indochina war (Yamakage, n.d.); and the Philippines (PH) just restored relations with Malaysia. The 5 states indeed needed to move past the political differences, think outside the box, and forge ahead for the sake of their individual states.

But more than that, they all wanted a more secure Southeast Asia to help each state pursue their individual needs in an environment characterized by political stability (Yamakage, n.d).

The period 1968-1971 was critical to Southeast Asia for 3 reasons: UK and US military withdrawals and Sino-US rapprochement (Koga, 2014). Britain made the initial announcement in 1967 that she will withdraw her forces from the “east of Suez” by mid-1970s. This was followed by US President Nixon’s announcement 2 years later – in 1969 – that US military would no longer be involved in a land war in Asia (Acharya, 2009). Nixon urged the US Asian allies to take care of their own defenses with the US only providing indirect assistance. The US likewise initiated rapprochement with both China and the Soviet Union aimed at decreasing political and military tensions in the international arena (Koga, 2014).

These scenarios were crucial to Southeast Asia as these could lead to a security vacuum (Koga, 2014). ASEAN leaders needed to “reformulate the regional balance of power” and “strengthen political cooperation”.

Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam as quoted by Acharya (2009) said, “The British decision to withdraw from the region in the seventies…and the withdrawal of direct American influence in Southeast Asian affairs…will (leave) a “power vacuum” which can be “filled from the outside.” Thus, his call for Southeast Asian states to strengthen “social, economic, and political foundation through cooperation and collective effort.”  

In retrospect, the changing security landscape compelled ASEAN to evolve politically as an organization. The protracted Vietnam war involving the US, Russia, and China was too huge to be ignored. Revisiting history, the war ended in April 1975, when Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, fell; captured by communist forces. With this victory, the government of South Vietnam surrendered. By July 1975, North and South Vietnam were formally unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam under a strong communist rule.

The year 1976 was indeed a bleak year for ASEAN considering the victory of the Communists in neighboring Vietnam plus the announced withdrawal of the British and the American forces from the region. Suddenly, a genuine external threat was looming for ASEAN.

On the bright side, 1976 also proved to be a decisive year for ASEAN. The development in Vietnam enabled ASEAN Member States (AMS) to look inwardly, assessed the region’s new reality vis-à-vis the changing landscape. According to Acharya (2009), the AMS agreed that there are risks involved on being overly dependent on great power security guarantees. They conceded that these guarantees could assist in “outright aggression” but not address radical social changes. They also recognized that military alliances are not a guarantee for a state to manage her own insurgency problem. In fact, it could even exacerbate it. Moreover, external powers in the face of domestic instability could compromise the legitimacy of the threatened regime, a lesson from the Vietnam war (Acharya, 2009).

Given this realist outlook, with Vietnam as a glaring example, internal stability should start from within, managed internally, and not by external interference.

These are the conditions that propelled ASEAN to formulate and promulgate the Zone Of Peace, Freedom And Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the Bali Concord I. (To be continued)

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Writer can be reached at belindabelsales@gmail.com. Twitter @ShilohRuthie./PN