LIOW (2017) asserts that ASEAN should call for transparency in China’s behavior and actuations over the SCS. Even with PH gaining an upper hand resulting from the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), China continues to ignore the decision and subsequently, the rule of law.
Liow (2017) supports Connelly (2017) in his observation that China’s economic influence has reinforced her assertive and even coercive stance in the “maritime heart” of Southeast Asia. Over the years, China has been the main trading partner of every Southeast Asian economy and additionally, China has become a major source of foreign direct investment. This economic interdependence between China and Southeast Asia, according to Liow, is seen in initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Liow further stated that with China’s economic stimulus in the region, Southeast Asian states will become beholden to China, and worse, highly dependent on Chinese investments.
Meanwhile, during President Barack Obama’s term, his administration pushed the “pivot” or “rebalance” strategy (Laksmana, 2017) with Connelly noting that a dependable level of engagement with both China and the US is preferred by the region executed through partnership and deepening of relationship. While the rebalance policy was acceptable to many Southeast Asian scholars, however, they argued the “economic engagement lagged military engagement”.
Moreover, Connelly underscored Trump’s propensity for transactional diplomacy compared to Obama’s approach, plus the fact that Trump is very unfamiliar with the region. Adding insult to injury, Trump reduced economic engagement with the region when the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
In hindsight, US-ASEAN relations started on the right foot with Trump hosting 4 ASEAN leaders in the White House, then traveled to Vietnam and PH to unveil his FOIP vision, and thereafter, held a US-ASEAN summit (Searight, 2020).
However, Trump skipped the EAS for the third straight year, and even with the presence of his National Security Advisor, AMS leaders were not pacified (Strangio, 2020). Ironically, while the US low-level engagement is happening, China is gaining new ground, with a revamped BRI, and progress toward launching the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Searight, 2020).
We can safely say that over time, relationships improve, stagnate, or deteriorate, as glimpsed from ASEAN’s disenchantment with the US but this doesn’t mean we terminate such relationship. The US has been an ally all the way back to the founding of ASEAN, particularly its relationship with PH – a founding AMS – being a former colony, and has been involved in the ARF, the ADMM Plus, the EAS, and even as a dialogue partner. We have benefited from the ASEAN-US partnerships and collaborations through the years.
Our disenchantment notwithstanding, we recognize that now, more than ever, we need the US to attain the so-called balance of power vis-à-vis China’s economic benevolence and country neighborhood diplomacy. China, a geographic neighbor, facilitates and expedites the conduct of multilateral cooperation and programs that earn the gratitude and praise of ASEAN leaders while ironically growing wary of becoming subservient to her. Truly a paradox!
We can probably rest easy knowing that ASEAN leaders are astute – they should be! In the recent past, the region’s lack of cohesion drew attention and flak when after PH won her case at the PCA over China’s expansive claims in the SCS, AMS leaders could not come up with a unified statement.
According to a news article published by The Straits Times, “ASEAN officials had prepared a draft text but there was no agreement to release a joint statement” earning the ire of scholars as kowtowing to China.
As a student of Southeast Asian Studies, I would say that was a faux pas on the part of ASEAN. Our neutral stand in relation to China or the US should not apply to a fellow member state. We can be neutral when dealing with other countries, but we should unequivocally rally behind our own. This for me, is the essence of regionalism.
Moving forward, if multilateralism is our Solomonic approach to this ongoing rivalry, then we should use it with savoir-faire, calculated power, core strength, and superb diplomacy – virtues not new to Southeast Asia since ASEAN has mastered these gems over the years.
Goh (2014) explained that multilateralism and related institutions manage power politics, especially the effects of unequal power, and ASEAN knows the level of her power vis-à-vis the great powers. For instance, in the case of China, ASEAN “can harness such power within a stable structure of interstate cooperation…” while imbibing and agreeing to rules and norms (Goh, 2014).
In a nutshell, Goh asserts that multilateralism is useful to both great powers and ASEAN because it is an instrument that can limit hegemony. ASEAN through its multilateral institutions and frameworks have engaged China and the US for a long time and both have agreed to adopt ASEAN norms in return for what they can get – long-term, institutionalized cooperation.
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Writer can be reached at belindabelsales@gmail.com. Twitter @ShilohRuthie./PN
