THE MANILA regional trial court has convicted Rappler’s Maria Ressa and Reynaldo Santos, Jr., of violation of Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
As explained by the judge, online libel has a harsher penalty than traditional libel under the penal code. The judge also ruled that the time limit for lodging a complaint is 12 years, as opposed to the one-year prescriptive period for traditional libel.
This conviction should alarm media practitioners in the country. It is common knowledge that almost all mainstream media organizations have internet or online versions of their stories. Are they now vulnerable to twin prosecutions for the same written article?
Maria Ressa’s case shows how a determined prosecution can ignore the principle that in interpreting criminal laws, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, consistent with the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence.
A contrary principle is detrimental to press freedom, with members of the media possibly censoring themselves for fear of displeasing people of wealth and power.
Rappler is a social news network that relies on the internet for the publication of its stories. There is no printed version of ink on paper.
In early 2012, the daily top story pertained to the impeachment trial of former Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Corona faced many charges in the Senate. He was alleged to have been dishonest in his declaration of assets, had excessive entanglement with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who appointed his wife to a government position, and discussed with litigants their pending cases in the Supreme Court.
In May 2012, when trial was about to close, Rappler posted a story entitled “CJ using SUVs of controversial businessmen.” It described how the former Chief Justice appeared to have been using vehicles registered in the name of controversial personalities.
One vehicle used by Corona was said to have been registered under the name of Wilfredo Keng, a businessman named by Forbes Magazine as one of the richest Filipinos in 2010.
The article cited an intelligence report that said that Keng was being surveilled by the National Security Council for his alleged involvement in human trafficking and drug smuggling. The report cited by Rappler also purportedly said Keng was involved in a murder case.
Interestingly, as cited in the RTC decision, Mr. Keng himself admitted that he had lent Corona one of his vehicles, but it was returned to him before the impeachment trial began.
Keng’s relationship with the former Chief Justice is not explained, but it is certainly a matter of public interest because the head of a co-equal branch of government was on trial at the time precisely for alleged corruption and partiality while in office. Judges are the least sociable public servants as a matter of public policy.
While Keng may have been a private individual, his relationship with the chief magistrate was a matter of public interest that the public had the right to be informed about.
Publication by the press of matters of public interest are privileged communications protected by the Constitution.
Justice Josue Bellosillo explained the import of the privilege when he reversed the conviction of famed newspaper columnist Art Borjal. The rule on privileged communications had its roots in the Bill of Rights which guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.
Publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
Justice Bellosillo adds that the concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. He quotes Justice George Malcolm who said that public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. “The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.”
Before the advent of the internet, the people’s need for news and opinion on current events was satisfied by newspapers, magazines, and radio and television broadcasts.
There used to be no memory bank for news and opinion pieces except for newspaper and broadcast archives. They fast became relics for research that required visits to the library and its microfilm section.
Thanks to the internet, information old and new can now be mined with a few taps on the computer keyboard. This is definitely a gigantic, unprecedented stride in the advancement of the people’s right to be informed on matters affecting the public interest.
Why is this advancement in communications employed by the press being penalized with stiffer penalties under the anti-cybercrime act? When problems of physical circulation may now be solved via online presence, are we not, in the same breath, discouraging the fuller realization of the right to freedom of information?
The criminal case against Ressa and Santos would have been instantly dismissible on two basic grounds: first, cyber-libel as a crime did not yet exist when the offending article was published; second, the time limit for government to indict them had lapsed.
But then, as we are wont to say: “Kung gusto may paraan, kung ayaw maraming dahilan.”/PN
